Research

This paper estimates short-run employment effects of California’s sectoral minimum wage for fast-food restaurants. On April 1, 2024, covered limited-service chains faced a $20 hourly floor while the statewide minimum wage was $16 (up from $15.50 in 2023). Using establishment-level mobility data and a difference-in-differences design restricted to the counties without local wage ordinances in CA, we proxy on-site staffing with weekly long-duration device visits (>4 hours). Baseline estimates indicate an average 8% decline in on-site staffing intensity at treated outlets relative to comparable full-service and retail establishments. An event-study shows no pre-trends and a gradual, persistent post-announcement decline, consistent with anticipatory staffing adjustments. Placebo estimates for exempt “enclosed” venues are null, and effects are similar across urban and rural locations. The results imply that a sectoral wage floor induces meaningful reductions in on-site staffing intensity at continuing establishments, with adjustments beginning before implementation rather than through immediate large-scale workforce changes.

Time-varying congestion prices are designed to shift travel away from peak periods, but the timing of toll cutoffs determines whether such adjustment occurs. I study this margin using New York City’s Congestion Relief Zone, which charges $9.00 to enter Manhattan south of 60th Street during peak hours — weekdays 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. and weekends 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. — and $2.25 overnight, creating an identical $6.75 E-ZPass differential at four daily boundaries. Applying a difference-in-discontinuities design to hourly mobile-device visit data comparing Lower Manhattan to Boston, I find that establishment visit starts increase by 5.9 percent at the weekday 5 a.m. boundary and by 9.2 percent at the weekend 9 p.m. boundary — exactly the two cutoffs where schedule constraints are least binding. Estimates at the weekday 9 p.m. and weekend 9 a.m. boundaries are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero, consistent with high schedule costs at those cutoffs. The asymmetry demonstrates that toll-boundary placement relative to travellers’ schedule constraints, not price magnitude, governs whether congestion pricing induces retiming.

Summer Youth Employment Programs are known to have significant impacts on youth outcomes based on lotteries from oversubscribed programs. But most cities cannot use a lottery design due to heterogeneity across youth and jobs. How can programs achieve efficiency and equity under alternative assignment mechanisms? Using hiring platform data, we study youth application and employer selection behavior to explore these design challenges. We find large mismatches between the distribution of youth versus jobs, leaving 10% to 25% of positions unfilled. Moreover, employers were nearly twice as likely to select white youth relative to their representation in the applicant pool. This disparity persisted when controlling for other demographics, the number and timing of applications, and job readiness. Our findings reveal that workforce development programs may perpetuate inequities in the absence of simple random assignment. Using a job matching algorithm, we show that placing just 30% of positions by lottery can improve both equity and efficiency.

This paper estimates the consumer response to California’s 2024 fast-food minimum wage (AB-1228), which raised the sectoral wage floor to $20, and examines how that response varies across the income distribution of customers. Using monthly transaction data for ten national fast-food chains and a difference-in-differences design that compares California outlets to the same chains in other states, the paper finds that customer visits and transactions at treated outlets fell by 6–7 percent, and total revenue at the representative establishment by about 5 percent. Because revenue fell by less than visits, spending per visit rose, consistent with partial pass-through of higher labor costs to prices. Transaction records resolved by customer income show that the decline in visits was concentrated among higher-income customers, who reduced visits by about 4 to 5.5 percent, whereas lower-income customers show no detectable decline; spending per visit rose across the income distribution. The product-market response to the minimum wage thus differs systematically by consumer income, a margin that studies of employment and prices do not observe.